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THE ISSUE OF CORPORATE STOCK FOR PROP-
ERTY PURCHASED-A NEW PHASE.
There are few problems in the law of corporations that arise
more frequently and none that concern the general public more
intimately than those arising in connection with the issue of cor-
porate stock in payment for property purchased by a corporation.
The reason for this is not far to seek, for it is well recognized
that the exchange of stock for property is the favorite method of
stock watering. In this connection it becomes of importance to
ascertain the precise meaning and application of enactments upon
this subject like that on the statute books of New Jersey, the
favorite home of corporations, and of those states which have
followed her lead.
Sections forty-eight and forty-nine of the New Jersey "Act
concerning Corporations,"'- Revision of 1896, are as follows:
"48. Nothing but money shall be considered as payment of
any part of the capital stock of any corporation under this act,
except as hereinafter provided in case of the purchase of property.
"49. Any corporation formed under this act may purchase
mines, manufactories or other property necessary for its business
.. .and issue stock to the amount of the value thereof in payment
therefor . .. ; and in the absence of actual fraud in the trans-
action, the judgment of the directors as to the value of the property
purchased shall be conclusive .. "
Though provisions virtually identical with these are to be
found in Connecticut,2 Delaware,' Maine,4 New York,6 North
r. Laws of I896, ch. 185.
2. General Laws, Sec. 3368.
3. Laws of igoi, oh. 167, Sec. 14.
4. Laws of 19or, ch. 229, Sec. 13.
5. General Laws, ch. 36, Sec. 42.
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Carolina,6 and Porto Rico ;7 though the statutes of West Virginias
and of Michigan9 are similar except that they have the word
"valuation" instead of "judgment as to the value," the former be-
ing precisely equivalent to the latter, and though, in addition, there
are other states whose courts, without the aid of legislation, have
taken the same position, yet, so far as careful research can dis-
close, the point of this discussion has never been presented to or
passed upon by any court.
To present the question more exactly, let a case be assumed,
arising in New Jersey, in which the record shows that the action
is by a judgment-creditor of an insolvent corporation, for himself
and all those similarly situated, etc., against a stockholder thereof
whose stock has been issued to him for property purchased by the
corporation; that the record of this latter transaction upon the
books of the company is an entry in the directors' minutes to the
effect, that it had been resolved by them that the company accept
A's (i. e., the defendant's) offer to sell certain property, and
that "the Board of Directors do hereby adjudge and declare that
said property is of the fair value of---dollars, and that the same is
necessary for the business of the company." The case further
shows that there is evidence, to the admission of which defendant
objects, to prove that the Board of Directors, which adopted this
resolution, was composed of "dummies," who, in taking their action,
had merely followed instructions so to do upon being told by the
attorney or other agent of the real parties in interest that the prop-
erty purchased was fairly worth the par value of the stock issued
in payment for it; that the directors of their independent know-
ledge or investigation knew nothing about the value of the prop-
erty purchased; and, finally, that the actual value of the property
at the time of its transfer to the corporation was materially smaller
than the par value of the stock issued in exchange for it. The
ground of defendant's objection to admitting the evidence in ques-
tion is that it does not tend to prove "actual fraud" and is, there-
fore, irrelevant. The complainant concedes that it does not tend
to prove that there was "actual fraud," but insists that it does
show that the directors did not exercise their "judgment," with-
in the terms of the statute, in purchasing the property and issuing
6. Laws of x9ox, ch. 2, Sec. 54.
7. Civ. Code, Title II., ch. x, See. 45.
8. Code, ch. 53, Sec. 24.
9. Pub. Acts, 1903, ch. 232, See. x.
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stock for it, and that, therefore, it is relevant and entitles him to a
recovery. Is the complainant's position correct?
Such a case could be most intelligently decided by consider-
ing, first, the evolution of the law upon the general subject of the
exchange of stock for property purchased up to the time of the
adoption of the enactment in question.
Taken for granted without discussion in Woodfall's Case,' 0
the common law rule was definitely settled by Drummond's
case" to the effect that a corporation may issue its stock in pay-
ment for property in order that, in the case of a person having
property which the corporation needed and wishing at the same
time to become a share-holder thereof, it might not be necessary
for him to go through the cumbersome process of first selling the
property to the company for cash and of then buying shares in it
with the money received. The practical common sense underly-
ing this rule caused it to be generally adopted either by decision 2
or statute or both.
It was not long before the ready means for stock-watering
afforded by the otherwise beneficent rule of Drummond's Case
was discovered and employed. The problem has, therefore, been
the devising and application of rules, such that, while the benefits
of the doctrine that stock may be issued for property are pre-
served, the evil purpose to which it may be perverted may be
avoided.
The first step taken toward the solution of that problem
was a regulation obviously demanded by justice and honest dealing.
If stock may be issued for property as well as for money, then,
of course, a given piece of property should command no more
stock than its equivalent in money. Hence, the enactment in New
Jersey, most of the other states having the same or similar pro-
visions, that stock when issued for property, shall be issued " to
the amount of the value thereof". (Section 49).
All along there was .the old equity rule, now embodied in Sec-
1o. 3 De G. and Sm., 63-1849. Early cases in the United States also are:
Tallmadge v. Fishkill Iron Co., 4 Barb., 382, 1848, and Carr v. Le Fevre, 27
Pa. St., 413, I856.
zI. L. R ., 4 Ch. 772-1869.
12. Steacy v. Railroad Co., 5 Dill., 348, 376; Farwell v. Yelegraph Co.,
16x IlL, 522, 532; Foster v. Refining Co., u8 Mo., 238, 263; Brant v. Ehlen
59 Md., I, 29; Foreman v. Bigelow, 4 Cliff., 508, 526; Ashuelot Co. v. Hod,
56 N. H., 548, 558; Wetherbee v. Baker, 35 N. J. E., 5o, 512; Kelley Bros. v.
Fletcher, 94 Tenn., x; New Haven Co. v, Linden Sfiring Co., r42 Mass., 349,
355; Kroenert v. Johnson, ug Wash., 96; Coffin v. Ramsdell, rxo Ind., 417.
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tion 21 of the New Jersey law, that where so much of a corpora-
tion's capital as is paid in, the whole thereof not having been paid,
is insufficient to satisfy its obligations, the stockholders shall be
liable to the corporation's creditors to the extent of the difference
between the par value of their stock and the amount paid therefor,
if less than that par value. It follows from this and the preceding
rule that if more stock at par is issued than the value of the prop-
erty taken therefor warrants, each share has been issued at a
discount, the capital of the company is not at all paid in, and the
stockholder should, therefore, in a proper case, be liable to credi-
tors. Though this theory seems clear enough, the decisions are
in hopeless confusion on the point of its practical application.
The discord in the decisions may be thts explained: While a
given sum of money represents the same amount of value to most
men, it is obvious that there may be as many different estimates
of the value of a given piece of property as there are people called
upon to pass an opinion, even though all act in the best of faith.
Moreover, it is just because there is that unity of opinion among
men as to the value of money, and that possible, even probable,
honest divergence among them as to the value of property, that
there is presented the opportunity, soon taken advantage of, for
purposely and dishonestly placing a fictitious value on chattels or
realty to be changed for the stock of a corporation. The question
upon which the courts divided was whether they would treat both
cases-i. e., honest and dishonest over-valuation-alike or not.
Most of the courts have agreed, that, if the directors kiowing-
ly and intentionally place a fictitious value upon property for which
stock is issued, then there has been actual fraud as against the
creditors of the corporation, and they may hold the stockholder
for the. difference between the par value of his shares and the
true value of the property given therefor by him."'
Suppose, however, that so far from there being any such
actual fraud, the directors of the corporation and the stockholder
acted with perfect honesty and that despite all their efforts truly
and accurately to collate and deliberate upon the various elements
that entered into the value of a given piece of property, the parties
fell into error or into what becomes such, only because of a subse-
quent, determination by a court differing from that of the directors
on a matter purely of opinion. Is the stockholder in such a case
to be liable?
On the other hand, it has been held that whether intentional
13. See cases infra, beginning with Young v. Iron Co., 65 Mich., xii.
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or not, the holding out as full paid stock which is not actually and
truly such is a feaud in law upon creditors of the corporation,
who rely on its assets being as represented and that, therefore,
they are to be allowed to come against the stockholder.1 '
Whatever may be the merit of this view, known as the "true
value" rule, in the realm of pure legal theory, its impracticability
is evident. Under it the transaction of business in corporate form
must in most cases be absurdly chaotic, if not hopelessly impossible.
Who will take the stock of a corporation in payment for his prop-
erty so long as the transaction is always subject to be overturned
years afterward at the instance of some resourceful creditor who
has unearthed an error committed in the strictest honesty by the
directors while coming to a judgment as to the value of his prop-
erty? The answer is given by the leading New York casel5 on
this subject, in which Chief Commissioner Lott declares:
"No person could be expected to become a stockholder, and
pay his money or appropriate his property, and he nevertheless
be held liable to a contribution in favor of creditors, to the extent
of the stock issued for such property, if a jury should, subse-
quently, and at an indefinite and unlimited period thereafter, find
that the trustees (directors) had under a mistake, but in an hon-
est exercise of their judgment, concluded, erroneously . . that
their property was in fact, as disclosed by subsequent events, not
. . . . actually worth the full sum allowed for it. There are many
circumstances that affect values. The time of purchase, the de-
mand for the article sought for, a limited supply, the credit given,
a panic in the money market, and various other matters, have their
influence and effect, and which cannot be properly appreciated at
a remote day after these causes have ceased to operate . . . The
construction given to the act by the court below, in its effect
imposes a penalfy on the stockholder in a company for a mistake
and erroneous judgment of its trustees in the faithful and honest
discharge of their duties."
This and other defects in the true value were recognized by
the courts of most of the states, and they, accordingly, have taken
the view that so long as there was no intentional overvaluation,
all "legal" or "equitable" (or other adjective showing that there
is no "actual") fraud is to be ignored and the judgment arrived
14. Chisholm v. Forny, 65 Ia., 333; Schickle v. Watts, 94 Mo., 41o; Libby
vz.Tobey, 82 Me., 397; Gillin v. Sawyer, 93 Me., xsx; Cole v. Adams, ir Tex
Civ. App. 507; Berry v. Rood, 67 S. W. (Mo.) 644.
r5. Schenek v. Andrews, 57 N. Y., 133, 143.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
at in good faith by the directors of the company to be regarded as
conclusive upon all parties.18
The states following this latter doctrine were then confronted
by a further problem. Conceding that actual fraud, consisting of
intentional over-valuation, must be found as a fact in order to
enable the creditors of a corporation to hold a stockholder thereof,
what, in the absence of controlling evidence aliunde, is the relevancy
and potency as evidence of such fraud, of the naked fact that a
given case is one of gross over-valuation ? Though the decisions
on this point, also, are by no means harmonious, in general, they
take the logical stand that where the value of given property is
not obvious and well settled, and especially where it depends upon
usefulness and exploitation in the future, it is entirely a matter of
opinion upon which there is room for large divergence, and there-
fore, the mere fact of over-valuation is in such case to be regarded
as absolutely no evidence of actual fraud. If, however, property
"'the value of which is well known and understood, or capable of
being easily ascertained, is taken at a most exorbitant estimate
far beyond any intrinsic or real value," then some dicta 7 say
that there is "strong evidence" of actual fraud, while it is usually
held" that proof of the above shifts upon the stockholder the
burden of going forward with evidence to show that the trans-
action by which he acquired his stock was not tainted by intentional
over-valuation of the property purchased by the directors for the
corporation.
In New Jersey, the "good faith" rule-i.e., the majority rule-
was established. The first case in point in that state was Wether-
bee v. Baker.'9 Five persons agreed for the purchase of a tract
of land and organized themselves into a corporation, the capital
of which was fixed at one hundred thousand dollars, all sub-
16. Young v. Iron Co.,65 Mich., 111, 124; Powers v. Knappjb, 85 Hun., 38;
Brant v. Ehien, 59 Md., z; Carr v. Le Fvre, 27 P. St., 413, 417; Kelley
Bros. v. Fletcher, 94 Tenn., i; Calivada Co. v. Hays, iig Fed., 2o2; Coit v.
GoldAmalgamating Co., 119 U.S., 343; Grant v. Railroad Co., 54 Fed., 569;
TrouO v. Horbach; 53 Neb., 795; Kroenert v. Johnson, ig Wash., 96; CoJan
v. Ramsdell, iio Ind., 417; Boynton v. Andrews, 63 N. Y., 93; Whitehill v.
Jacobs, 75 Wis., 474; Welburn v. Chenault, 43 Kan., 352; Malting Co. v.
Brewing Co., 65 Minn., 28; Schenckv. Andrews, 57 N. Y., 133; Richardson
v. Mining Co., 65 Pac., 74; Gilkie &- Anson Co. v. Gas Co., 46 Neb., 333.
17. Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., z9 U. S. 343.
18. Boynton v. Andrews, 63 N. Y., 93; Malting Co. v. Brewing Co., 6S
Minn., 28; Coleman v. Howe, 154 IlL, 458; Taylor v. Walker, 137 Fed., 737;
Macbeth v. Banfield, 78 Pac., (Ore.), 692.
19. 35 N. J. E., 5oI-1992.
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scribed for by the five, who also became the directors of the
company. The price to be paid for the land was fifty thousand
dollars, and the deed being made directly to the corporation, it
gave its obligations for the purchase money. The directors then
appraised the land at one hundred thousand dollars and by reso-
lution credited fifty thousand dollars of the valuation as pay-
ment of fifty per cent of their own subscriptions to the capital
stock. The land was not worth more than the original purchase
money. In a suit by a creditor of the corporation, then insolvent,
against the directors on the ground that nothing had been paid
for their stock, the Court of Errors and Appeals, by Judge Depue,
declared that "the subscriptions to the capital stock constitute a
trust fund for the payment of debts," of which fund the directors
are trustees; that as such the latter must administer their trust
in good faith, and that in cases of payment for capital stock by
property, such as the case before it, it is only when the directors
estimate the value of such property in good faith that their valu-
ation can stand against the attacks of creditors of the corporation.
In the case before it, the court found that there had not been such
good faith, but, on the contrary, that "the appraisement, it is mani-
fest, was illusory and made only in the interest of the directors who
were to profit by it."
The bearing of this case, then, is simply in accordance with
the general rule, that fraudulent over-valuation renders the stock-
holder liable, the fraud being found, not a matter of law from the
mere fact of a difference between the actual value of the property
and that placed upon it by the directors, but as a finding of fact
from all the evidence before the court. Though the case is not
itself a decision following the majority doctrine on the point upon
which the courts divide, yet it plainly indicated that in an appropri-
ate ease the court would adhere to that view.
The next case is that of Bickley v. Schlag.20 That was a bill
by a judgment creditor of an insolvent corporation against the
stockholders thereof, to compel them to liquidate, for the benefit
of the complainant, the alleged arrears of their subscriptions to
the capital stock of the company. The stockholders had paid for
their seventy-five thousand dollars, par value, of stock with prop-
erty found to be the actual value of only sixty-four thousand
dollars. The decree below, applying the true value rule, was that
the stockholders make good the deficiency. The Court of Errors
and Appeals, Chief Justice Beasley writing the opinion, reversed
20. 46 N. J. E., 533-1890.
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this, and ranged itself squarely on the side of the good faith rule,
declaring that "the substance of the true issue has been over-
looked" and that the "valuation of property in making the exchange
. . . cannot be supervised or controlled by the court of chancery,
for, in the absence of deceit or some other corrupt constituent,
the bargain between the parties cannot be disturbed."
Edgerton v. The Electric Improvement and Construction Co. 21
is the next case. The complainant sought the specific performance
of a contract by which the defendant corporation agreed to issue
to him the whole of its capital stock as fully paid for two inven-
tions. One of the inventions for which the stock was to have been
issued was shown to be unperfected, and the goods manufactured
under the other to be worthless. Since the directors knew these
facts before issuing the stock to complainant, it would, of course,
have been actual fraud for them to have issued the stock in com-
pliance with the contract, and so the Vice-Chancellor held, stating
that:
"If the officers had issued this amount of stock on the unsub-
stantial basis indicated, it would have been the duty of this court,
if the question had been properly presented for decision, to have
declared that such issue was fraudulent and not authorized by the
true consideration of the act, and it cannot by its decree direct that
to be done which it would thus condemn."
The question arose again in Hebbard v. The Southwestern
Land and Cattle Co. 2 2  In that case stock was issued to twenty
times the value of the property taken in payment for it. The evi-
dence showed that the property was knowingly and dishonestly
over-valued and accordingly the stockholder was held liable.
On the whole, then, these cases lead to the conclusion that
even prior to the enactment of Chapter i85, Section 49 of the laws
of 1896, the law of New Jersey was that "in the absence of actual
fraud, the judgment of the directors as to the value of the property
purchased shall be conclusive" upon all parties. In other words,
the statute was merely declaratory of the common law of the state.
2 8
Beyond the point of declaring their adherence either to the
true value rule or to the good faith rule and of determining the
significance of the mere fact of over-valuation as evidence of
21. 5o N. J. E., 354-1892.
22. 55 N. J. E.. 18-x896.
23. Easton National Bank v. American Brick &- TIle Co., 6o At.
(N. J.) 54-Feb., i9o5; Donald v. American Smelting Co., 62 N. J. E., 729
733.-1900.
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actual fraud, none of the courts has gone, up to the present time.
The question is now raised as to the precise meaning of the good
faith rule, the statute of New Jersey and of the other states which
copied it being taken as the correct and accurate expression of
that rule.
24
The vice of the true value rule, which, as we have seen, caused
its repudiation by most of the courts, lay in the fact that it was en-
tirely too stringent; it was like the physician who terminates his
patient's ills by killing the patient. On the other hand, the ques-
tion herein discussed is, in ultimate analysis, whether New Jersey,
in her real zeal to avoid destructive caution, has rushed to the other
extreme, even more impolitic, of establishing a doctrine too loosely
liberal. By providing that the directors' "judgment" shall be con-
clusive, does the statute command that a mere entry by "dummy
directors," who are virtually ignorant of everything concerning
the business of which they are the titular managers, to the effect
that they have "adjudged" a piece of property to be of such and
such value-does the statute direct that such a compliance with
form and violation of substance shall be final? It is submitted
that the answer must be negative, and that, on the elementary
principles of statutory interpretation.
The basic principle of all judicial interpretation of a statute
is to determine the intent of the legislature, for the intent of a
statute is the law.2
The next rule which applies to all statutes, is that the intent
24. Perhaps as good a statement of the good faith rule as any to be found
in the books is that in Powers v. Knah (85 Hun. (N. Y.) 38, 4r; affd. on
opinion below, 158 N, Y., 733), where the court says:
"A mere mistake or error of judgment of the trustees (directors) either asto the necessity of the purchase or as to the value of the property, if made ingood faith and not in evasion of the statute, will not subject the holder of the
stock issued for property to the liability provided by section io (substantiallythe same as section 21, (referred to in the text at page 114). of the New JerseyLaw). Section 2 of the Statute of I853 (like the New Jersey Law, section 49before the addition of the provision, in x896, that "in the absence of actualfraud in the transaction the judgment," etc.) gives the trustees (directors) adiscretion, and they are to be the judges both as to the necessity for the prop-erty purchased and as to the value of it. Good faith and the exercise of aproper discretion and honest judgment are all that is required."
25. Orvill v. Woodcl&fl. 64 N. J. L., 286; Ogden v. Strong, 2Paine, 584;
McClusky v. Cromwell, ii N. Y., 593; Railroad v. Hemphill, 35 Miss., r7;United States v. Hartwell, 73 U. S. 385,396; Atkins v. Disintegrating Co.85 U. S. 272, 301; Riggs v. Palmer. i5s 'N. Y., So; Mffan-
hattan Co. v. Kaldenberg, 165 N. Y., 1, 7; Andelo v. Peofile, iob,
IB1. App., 558; Grimes v. Reynolds, 68 S. W., 588: Blair v. Coakley, 48 S. E.,
804; Fordyce v. Bridges, r H. L. C., i.
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of the legislature is first, of course, to be sought in the words
employed in a given enactment."'
If the language of the statute is clear, distinct and unambig-
uous, the quest for the legislative intent is ended, for as the maxim
goes, it is not permitted to interpret that which is not in need of
interpretation. The plainly and unequivocally expressed mandate
of the law-making body must without further ado be obeyed,
assuming, of course, that no question of constitutionality enters. 27
The fourth of these fundamental principles is that the words
of a statute are to be regarded as employed in their common,
familiar, obvious signification, and are not to be twisted or dis-
torted in order to extend or restrict their meaning. 28
Applying these principles to the statute in question, the prob-
lem reduces itself to the simple one of determining the ordinary,
popular meaning of the word "judgment." By "judgment" all
who use the term mean the conclusion reached by one who takes
the attitude of a judge, that attitude implying, first, knowledge of
or acquaintance with the matter to be judged, and, secondly, colla-
tion of and deliberation upon the various elements of fact upon
which a conclusion must be based. In short, without assuming that
definitions given by dictionaries are decisive 29 of the ordinary and
popular signification of a word, it is submitted that the familiar
meaning of the term "judgment" is the same as that given by the
lexicographers. The "Standard Dictionary" declares that "judg-
ment" is "the mental operation by which facts are weighed, com-
26. Orvill v. Woodcliff, sujfra; McClusky v. Cromwell, sufira; Clark
v. Mayor, 29 Md., 277, 283; United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S., 95, 102.
Mayor v. Railroad, 143 N. Y., 1, 20; State v. Insurance Co., 66 Ark., 466;
Fordyce v. Bridges, sufira.
27. Railroad vz. Commissioners, i8 N. J. L., 71; Townsend v,. Brown, 24
N. J. L., 8o; Rudderow v'. Ferry Co., 31 N. J. L., 5X2; Douglass v. Free-
holders, 38 N. J. L., 214; Gay v. Hervey, 41 N. J. L., 39; 'Commissioners z,.
Brewster, 42 N. J. L., 125; Woodrufl v. State, 52 Atl.. 294; Swartz v.
Siegel, 117 Fed. 13; Mayor v. Railroad, supr.a; Peofile v. Railroad, 201, II.
65; Peopile v. Sands, 102 Cal., z2; McKay v. Railroad, 75 Conn. 608; Yerhe
v. United States, 143 U. S., 439: -Unted States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399.
28. State v. Deshler, 25 N. J. L., 177; ,hrcLorinan v. Townshko, 49
N. J. L., 6r4; McClusky v. Cromwell, sujfra; Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo., 232,
264; Peojfle v. Reis, 76 Cal., 269, 279; Harrison v. State, 102 Ala., 17o; En-
terjorise v. Snith, 66 Ark., 815; Bacon v. Commissioners, 126 Mich., 22;
Power Co. v. Power Co., 172 U. S., 474, 49i; Treat v. White, i8i U. S., 264;
Insurance Association v. Tucker, L. R., 12 Q. B. D., 176, 186; Unwin v.
Hanson, L. R. (1891) 2 Q. B., 115.
29. McLorinan v,. Townshifp, suira.
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parison and deductions made, and conclusions reached," or "the
decision or conclusion reached, as after consideration or delibera-
tion." In Webster, it is stated that "judgment" is "The determin-
ation of the mind, formed from comparing the relations of ideas,
or the comparisons of facts and arguments." And to show what
is essential to the exercise of "judgment," the author lays it down
that, "In the formation of our judgments, we should be careful
to weigh and compare all the facts connected with the subject."
Again in Timmins v. Wade, 30 the charge of the trial judge to
the jury was objected to, because he told them to be guided by their
own "judgment" in finding or' refusing to find a certain fact. On
appeal it was held that the term, as used by the judge (and certainly
in instructing a jury, the court employs words in their natural and
common-place signification), meant "a decision resulting from the
mental process of reasoning, or that faculty of the mind by which
a person is enabled, by a comparison of ideas, or an examination
of facts, to arrive at a just conclusion in reaching for the truth."
In the hypothetical case, there was no such weighing and com-
paring of facts or drawing of conclusions; there was no such de-
liberation upon or consideration of all (nor, indeed, of any) of the
facts connected with the subject, and there was, therefore, no exer-
cise of judgment. The only kind of act on the part of the
directors which the statute declares shall be conclusive, was, there-
fore, not present and it follows that the action which the directors
did in fact take was not conclusive. The complainant should, ac-
cordingly, be allowed to recover fhe difference between the actual
value of the property purchased by the corporation and the par
value of the stock issued for it.
At this point this whole discussion might well be concluded,
were it not for the fact that it would then be subject to attack on
thie score of having begged the real question in issue in assuming
that the language of the enactment is unambiguous. Because two
contructions are sought to be placed upon a given enactment, it
does not follow that the enactment is ambiguous; it may well be
that one construction contended for is totally incorrect and un-
warranted. Such, it is submitted, is the case here. However, in
view of the possible criticism just mentioned it is thought best to
pursue the subject further.
Assuming, therefore, that the provision is equivocal, or at least
not entirely clear, what then?
It is a principle commonly applied in cases where the signifi-
30. 5 Ind. App. 139.
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cation of a given portion of an act is not quite free from doubt,
the whole act is to be considered with the view to deducing the gen-
eral intent and purpose of the legislature therefrom and then
applying the same to the doubtful clause.3 '
There can be no question that the New Jersey Corporation
Law was conceived in a spirit of liberality and intended for that
reason to be attractive to corporate enterprise. This was the
avowed design of the revision of 1896 and is not to be disputed. It
is not true, however, that because liberality was intended, license
is to be protected, especially where the line that divides the two is
easily ascertainable. The liberality that pervades the act as a
whole is fully preserved by the construction of Section 49, which
it is herein sought to establish, while to sustain the applicability of
the section to a case like the one outlined at the beginning of this
discussion would be to extend license to the point of fraud in the
field of corporations. And this is easily demonstrated.
In the first place, when it is found, as it must be, that there has
been no "judgment" by the directors and it is still insisted that
the section applies, it must be on the theory that the section, as
it stands, means the same as if it read "and in the absence of
actual fraud, the action taken by the directors shall be conclusive."
Secondly, the restriction as to "actual fraud" is in practice in nine
cases out of ten, as in the hypothetical case, useless and of no effect
through being readily rendered inapplicable. For who -shall say
that there has been actual fraud-i. e., intentional over-valuation
at the very least 2 where the directors who placed the value upon
the property, so far from having any intention of their own at all,
were virtually ignorant of everything connected with its value.
The statute would thus have no other meaning or effect than that
any action, no matter how arbitrary or capricious, and without
restriction as to fraud, taken by the directors in exchanging stock
for property shall be conclusive. That looseness run riot would
characterize any such enactment cannot be denied, for it would be a
source of encouragement and protection to all who wished to trans-
31. Matter of Thomas Murfihy, 23 N. J. L., i8o; Jersey Co. v. Davison,
29 N. J. L., 415; State v,. Mayor, 35 N. J. L., 196; Scottyv. Mayer, 68 N. J. L.,
687; Matter of John W. Livingston, 121 N. Y., 94; Manhattan Co. v. Kal-
denberg, x65 N. Y., i; Peofile v. Chicago, 152 Il., 546. State v. Roby, 142
Ind., 168; Fitzgerald v. Rees, b7 Miss., 473; Trust Co. v. Trust Co., 62 Minn.,
5Ot; Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33; Newbert v. Fletcher, 84 Me., 408;
United States v. Buchanan, 9 Fed., 689.
32. Easton National Bank v. American Brick &- Tile Co., 60 Ad.
(N. J.) 54-Feb., 1905.
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form a hundred dollars into a thousand by the simple process of
having "dummy directors" "declare and adjudge" that the hundred
dollars in chattels or realty was of the value of a thousand dollars.
Can it be that the legislature intended this?
To this question a further salutary and well settled rule of
statutory interpretation gives the answer, the rule, namely, that a
construction leading to injustice and unreason will not be adopted,
because the intention to accomplish either will not be attributed to
the legislature, so long as the language of a given statute may be
construed so as to avoid those consequences. As an eminent
authority on statutory construction expresses it: '0
"A construction which must necessarily occasion great public
and private mischief must never be preferred to a construction
which will occasion neither or not in so great a degree, unless the
terms of the instrument absolutely require such a preference."
If this principle be applied to Section 49 of the New Jersey
law the safe and sane liberality which was intended to characterize
the act is fully preserved. The liberality consists in the fact that it
does not permit the stockholder to be liable to the honest error of
the directors in forming their judgment, as does the true value
rule, and the sanity and safety of the position lie in the fact that
it does not invite and foster fraud, as would the other construction.
The fact that the New Jersey legislature did not intend any
such extraordinary thing as the construction necessary to be ap-
plied to the statute in order to have it cover a case like the one
assumed is further shown by a statute as to crimes enacted -so
recently as during the last session and providing that:
"Any person or persons who shall organize or incorporate, or
procure to be organized or incorporated, any organization or body
corporated under the laws of this state, with intent thereby to
further, promote or conduct any fraudulent or unlawful object,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
"Any person or persons who, being officers, directors, man-
agers or employees of any corporation or body politic incorporated
33. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. Sec. 489, and cases cited.
See also Jersey Co. v. Davison, 29 N. J. L., 415; 26 Am. & Eng. Encyc., 646.
34. New Jersey Public Laws, 1905, ch. 257. That it is permissible to con-
sider a subsequent act upon the same subject to ascertain the legislative in-
tent, see: Penitentiary Co. v. Nelms, 65 Ga., 67; United States v. Freeman,
3 How., 556,585; Bear v. Pear, 33 Pa. St., 525, 530;MfatterofLivingston, 12r
N. Y., 94, 104; Cocheu v. Al. P. Church, 32 N. Y. App. Div., 239; Rolle v.
Whyte, L. R. 3 Q. B. 286.
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under the laws of this state, shall wilfully use, operate or control
said corporation or body corporate for the furtherance or pro-
motion of any fradulent object, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
On the assumption still that the language of Section 49 is not
in itself quite clear, there are yet other canons of interpretation
which require the view herein taken.
It is laid down 3 5 that it is the duty of the court so to construe
statutes as to defeat all attempts to evade them. We have seen
that the actual fraud, which, alone, under the construction dis-
approved, can be made the ground for attacking the action taken
by the directors in exchanging stock for property is readily evaded
by the device of "dummy directors." On the other hand under
our interpretation, the statute cannot be so circumvented. The
directors, whoever they may be, and irrespective of whether their
interest be real or feigned, must exercise their judgment; nothing
less will make their action final and conclusive. Again, if while
exercising their judgment, they intentionally overestimate one
element or ignore another entering into the value of the property
to be judged, their action is not final. It is submitted that it is
difficult to conceive of any other possible regulation of this sub-
ject at the same time so broad and so wholesome.
Again, it is a rule of law as well settled as any can be, that
where discretion or judgment to an act in a given matter as he or
they deem proper is vested in a given person or body of persons,
that discretion is not to be so wielded as to amount to a
despotism. "
For the same reason that a body vested with the discretion of
removing a subordinate officer may not remove him without a hear-
ing, 37 and on the mere accusation, it may be, of an interested party,
a body vested with the power to come to a conclusive judgment as
to the value of property may not declare ex cathedra, or without
consideration, that it is of a certain given value, arid that on the say-
so, as is usually the case, of interested persons. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States has said 3 8 that the exercise
of judgment "excludes caprice, whim and every arbitrary award."
35. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, See. 138.
36. Alclfanus v. Finan, 4 Ia., 283, 287; Lovinier v. Pearce. 70 N. C.,
x67, 17I: Rothrock v. Carr, 55 Ind., 33,; Dooley v. Barker, 2- Mo., App.,
325, 328; Rose v. Brown, ii W. Va., 122, 142; Norris v. Clinkscales. 47
S. C., 488, 498; The Styria v. Morgan, r86 U. S., '1, 9; Lee v. Railroad.
L. R. 6 C. P., 576, 580; In re Taylor, 4 Oh. D., 157, 159.
37- Andrews v. King, 77 Mo. 244.
38. ColIon v. Colton, 127 U. S., 300, 317.
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It is not considered that the interpretation herein placed upon
the statute is a strict one. But if it were, it would be proper, for
the whole of Section 49, which permits property to be taken as
payment for stock, is an exception to the preceding section, and the
rule is that the language of exceptions is to be -strictly construed in
order to give the broadest scope to the general enactment and that
he who seeks benefit of an exception must show himself to be
clearly within it.39
Indeed, the whole corporation act, because it grants an ex-
traordinary power-namely, that of being a corporation-is to be
strictly construed so as to protect the general public to the fullest. 40
Thus, assuming even that the statute in itself is not entirely
clear, there seems to be no doubt that when the legislature enacts
that the judgment of the directors, and not that any action taken
by them shall be conclusive, it means that the conclusion reached
by the directors after the consideration of all relevant facts and
only that should be conclusive. Accordingly, when the Court in
Donald v. American Smelting Co..' says in a dictum that "after
the property has been purchased and the stock issued therefor,
nothing short of actual fraud in the transaction can impair the right
of the holder to hold his stock as full paid stock, free from further
call," the statement can be regarded as correct only provided that
the directors had exercised their "judgment" when negotiating the
transaction.
Indeed, the truth of this view as to the significance of the
term "judgment" seems to have been appreciated in practice by
those most intimately concerned; this is fairly indicated by the fact
that a compliance,pro forma, with the statute, as herein interpreted,
is usually observed by first having the nominal directors informed
either by the prospective recipient of the stock or by his agent that
39. Roberts v. Yarboro, 4r Tex., 449, 452; Bragg v. Clark, 5o Ala., 363.
j65; Ryan v'. Carter, 9 3 U. S.. 78, 83; -fifis v. Efifis, 17 111. App. x96, 200;
United States v. Dickson, z5 Pet. 141, 165; McRae v. Holcomb, 46 Ark., 3o6,
311.
40. Railroad v. Briggs, 22 N. J. L. 623, 644; Jersey City v. Railroad,
4o N. J. E., 417; Black v. Canal CO., 24 N. J. E., 455, 474; "orris Canal Co. v.
Railroad Co., 16 N. J. E., 419,436; Bridge Co. v. Ferry Co., 29 Conn., 210, 223;
Huntington v. Bank, 96 U. S., 388, 392; Railroad v. Railroad, 130 U. S., I,
20.
4r. 62 N. J. E., 729, 732, 19o. This statement was onlya dictum becablse
the case directly before the court involved merely questi3ns arising before the
issue of stock for property.
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the property is worth the par value of the stock to be issued for it,
and by then having them "adjudge" that it is of that value.
Accordingly, in the hypothetical case, evidence tenling to show
that the directors were "dummies" is admissible, and on proof of
that fact complainant should recover. But let this be clearly under-
stood. The ground of complainant's recovery is not, that by fail-
ing to exercise their judgment the directors were ipso facto guilty
of actual fraud. That is not the contention. The contention is,
that in order to make the action of the directors in taking property
for stock conclusive, two requirements must under the statute have
been fulfilled-namely, an exercise of judgment must have been
present and actual fraud must have been absent; that failure to
satisfy either of the requirements renders the stockholder liable,
and that in the case under consideration the stockholder is liable
because the former was not satisfied.
In conclusion, it may be well to point out that, if the con-
tention that the statute requires the directors to act in a judicial
capacity in order that their action in exchanging stock for property
may be conclusive is sound, it follows, since no man may be the
judge in his own cause, and since this maxim applies not only to
judges eo -nomine but also to all persons exercising judicial func-
tions, 42 that, even though the "dummy directors" did come to a
judgment, properly speaking, such jfudgment, if they were "dum-
mies" in the true sense of the term, is not conclusive, because they
were the creatures of one of the parties interested in the matter
to be judged.
Leonard M. Wallstein.
42. State, Winans et at. Pros. vi. Crane, 36 N. J. L., 394; Traction Co. v'.
Board of Works, 56 N. J. L., 43i.
